USA v. Jason Clark by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-19-2012 
USA v. Jason Clark 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jason Clark" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1124. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1124 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1115 
 ___________ 
 




 JASON CLARK, 
              Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
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 District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
 ____________________________________ 
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 Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit 
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 In 2005, appellant Jason Clark pleaded guilty to one count of possession with 
intent to distribute 150 grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)), one 
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), and one 
count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. 
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§ 924(c)(1)), charges attached to conduct from 2001.  He was sentenced to an aggregate 
term of 176 months of imprisonment.  Before this Court is Clark’s appeal of his second 
motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2),1
 In his motion, Clark argued that both the guidelines applicable to his sentence and 
the relevant mandatory minimum term of imprisonment have been lowered since he was 
originally sentenced.  He pointed to 
 which was denied by 
the District Court.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
Freeman v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 
2685 (2011), which addressed “whether defendants who enter into plea agreements that 
recommend a particular sentence as a condition of the guilty plea may be eligible for 
relief under § 3582(c)(2).”  Id. at 2690.  In opposing Clark’s motion, the Government 
argued that Freeman did not apply, as the plea agreement was not pegged to a guidelines 
range.  The District Court agreed with this reasoning, finding Clark’s case to not “fit 
within Freeman
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  While the ultimate decision to 
reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is committed to the discretion of the 
District Court, we exercise plenary review over the Court’s legal analysis.  
” because his sentence “was based solely on his plea agreement” and not 
“the guidelines range.” Order n.2, ECF No. 60. 
United States 
v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Doe
                                                 
1 Section 3582(c)(2) allows for the sentencing court to reduce the term of imprisonment if 
a defendant was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that 
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 
, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
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 When Clark was originally sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) required 
that “any person who . . . in furtherance of [a drug trafficking] crime, possesses a 
firearm” shall “in addition to the punishment provided for such . . . drug trafficking 
crime” be sentenced to “a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.”  Meanwhile, 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006) imposed a ten-year mandatory minimum for possession of 
more than 50 grams of crack.  Taken together, the mandatory minimum sentence Clark 
could expect was a fifteen-year term.  The plea agreement to which Clark was a party 
reflected an understanding of such a sentence2 (see Guilty Plea Agreement § 3(a), ECF 
No. 40), and Clark’s counsel acknowledged that fifteen years was “the lowest sentence 
which this Court may impose” (see
Several years later, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  Section 2 of the Act amended the relevant subsection of 
21 U.S.C. § 841, striking “50 grams” and inserting “280 grams.”  
 Def.’s Sentencing Memo. 6, ECF No. 46).   
See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).  The Act also led to the promulgation of sentencing guidelines 
reflecting the new statutory scheme.  See United States v. Dixon
 We need not determine whether the modification of the guidelines could affect 
relief under § 3582 and 
, 648 F.3d 195, 197–98 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
Freeman, because Clark was sentenced to a mandatory-minimum 
statutory term that still applies to him.  In United States v. Reevey
                                                 
2 The sentence was reduced somewhat due to prior-custody credits that are not relevant 
here.  
, 631 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 
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2010), we held that the Fair Sentencing Act is not retroactive if both the offense and 
initial sentencing occurred before its enactment, as is the case here.  Id. at 114–15.  A 
defendant is not eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) if another statute or provision, 
such as a statutory mandatory minimum, controls his sentence. See Doe
 In sum, we agree with the District Court that it could not adjust Clark’s sentence 
under § 3582.  We will therefore affirm its judgment. 
, 564 F.3d at 312.  
Thus, as Clark was sentenced to the minimum time possible under the old statutory 
scheme, the fact that a guidelines range has changed in the interim is of no moment.  
Finally, to the extent that Clark attacks the constitutionality of his sentence, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) is not the proper vehicle for doing so.  
